The paper discusses the problem of demarcation between the dimensions of natural and the human sciences in contemporary cosmology. In spite of a common presumption that cosmology is a natural science, the specificity of its alleged subject matter, that is the universe as a whole, makes cosmology fundamentally different from other natural sciences. The reason is that in cosmology the subject of cosmological research and its "object" are in a certain sense inseparable. Any study of the universe involves two opposite perspectives which can be described as "a-cosmic" and "cosmic", egocentric and non-egocentric are much more vague that those in the natural sciences. Correspondingly, the objective of this paper is to elucidate the nature of cosmology's claims for the value and truth of its theories in a cross-disciplinary context related to knowability of the universe and its relation to human agency, its history and self-understanding. This will be done in the perspective where cosmology is treated as a mode of human activity contributing to the "infinite tasks" of humanity, its culture and spiritual advance.
Introduction
Contemporary physical cosmology is a well established and vast enterprise which includes astronomical observations, space programmes, research institutions and funding strategies.
Cosmology develops fast. Every day one discovers dozens of new publications on the internet archives.
Monographs and popular books telling stories about the universe, about its study and those who study it are in abundance. Cosmological ideas are which go beyond scientific justification and this involves the whole field into an interdisciplinary discourse in which the criteria of validity and truth are much more vague that those in the natural sciences. Correspondingly, the objective of this paper is to elucidate the nature of cosmology's claims for the value and truth of its theories in a cross-disciplinary context related to knowability of the universe and its relation to human agency, its history and self-understanding. This will be done in the perspective where cosmology is treated as a mode of human activity contributing to the "infinite tasks" of humanity, its culture and spiritual advance.
Physical cosmology and an input of philosophy
Cosmology, understood as part of theoretical physics, forms a subject matter that by its very nature tests the boundaries and the very possibility of scientific explanation. Indeed, cosmology describes itself as a science which deals with "the universe as a whole", the universe as the all-encompassing, singular and unique "object" of cosmology. However the usage of the word "object" applied to the universe as a whole is problematic simply because the mainstream understanding of objectivity does not allow the concept of the universe to fit in it. Indeed, according to this view the universe consists of independent individual things (objects) which are embedded in space-time. These things as objects are individuals, because they have a spatiotemporal location, they are a subject of predication of properties, and they are distinguishable from each other through some properties. The universe as a whole cannot be thought as an object (or as an individual) because it is as a whole not embedded in space-time (it is rather a totality of space and time which transcends their characteristic features such as extension).
2 The universe is unique and cannot be distinguishable from anything through particular properties because, by definition, it comprises everything. The predication of the universe as a whole in terms of properties is problematic because the universe does not attain original givenness in the manner characteristic of particular individual things.
3
The constitution of an individual thing as an object, that is as a thing subjected to thematisation and objectification assumes as a condition the release from "environmental confinement" 4 or the context in which a thing is looked at. The universe as a whole cannot be released from such a confinement because, in a way, it is itself, by definition, the ultimate environment and context for everything. 5 Thus the standard meaning of the phrase "object of explanation" as if its identity has been defined cannot be applied to the universe with any ontological clarity. 6 But we do indeed understand and use this expression "the universe"
and therefore there must be a manner in which the universe is given, a consciousness of the universe that bestows sense on such language. This implies that before any philosophical deliberation or scientific thematisation of the universe, there must be experience of the universe as the recognition that there is the permanent and persistent in the background of change or the variable. There is the sense of identity of the universe as an intentional correlate of subjectivity, but the identity as ideal and unfulfilled. A possible scientifically reductive approach to identity of the universe as an inherent and non-relational aspect of an entity or a logical subject does not clarify the ontological status of this identity. Within these, so to speak, existential delimiters, the universe of cosmology, being thematised, naturally represents the ultimate noematic limit in the process of scientific exploration and explanation. Nothing further is empirically or theoretically accessible to which recourse can be made in order to explain the most general properties of the universe as a whole and the facticity of its own existence. 7 In one way or another, natural scientific explanation stops right there.
The very existence of the universe turns out to be the precondition for physical science:
the latter describes and explains phenomena which take place in the universe as something which is already given. This is the reason why the universe (as the totality of being) is not itself subject to a physical explanation. The phenomena with which physics deals have to be present.
Physics simply takes the existence of its objects for granted. The laws of physics are laws that hold within this universe; they do not purport to be laws that hold across "universes" (which in this sense would be universal for many universes with different contingent properties), whatever that would mean. Physics is not able to enquire into the underlying facticity of the phenomena within the universe. If this facticity is associated with the contingent appearance of phenomena (as contingent outcomes of physical laws 8 ) as if these phenomena manifest the radical coming into being of that which has not been before, physics definitely cannot link the being of these phenomena with that something (non-being) they come from. In other words, physics can deal with the manifestations of being but not with the ground of these manifestations in "non-being". It deals with something that obeys laws which are already in being. In technical philosophical language the same idea can be expressed differently: since physical cosmology is capable of apprehending the interior of the universe, the universe exhibits itself as intelligible; but because of the contingent nature of this intelligibility (it cannot explain itself, otherwise it would not be contingent) the universe embodies a semantic reference beyond itself. Cosmologists cannot themselves deal with this "other-worldly" reference and conduct a proper philosophical work. Some physicists in an attempt to address the foundational questions in cosmology make manifest a "philosophical" mode, not because they adhere to a realm of "philosophy" but because they do not follow the normal ways of theory-assessment in the natural sciences. This was the original motivation, for example, for inflationary cosmologies which aspired to explain away the problem of the special initial conditions of the universe responsible for the contingent display of the astronomical universe. A similar motivation lies in ideas of multiverse. However, these models, having a developed mathematical basis and being employed for problem-solving, raise philosophical problems and need competence and appraisal through borrowing methods of philosophy and insights of the human sciences.
One can generalise by saying that on the one hand physical cosmology avoids touching upon ultimate questions; on the other hand, because of the special status of its subject matter, that is the universe as a whole, as well as the fundamental inseparability of human subjectivity from the universe, cosmology is imbued with these questions and in order to attend to them one has to invoke a philosophical attitude to cosmology.
9
By conducting a philosophical analysis of cosmology one can on the one hand articulate the qualities of cosmological theory which make it scientific, and identify the naturalistic limits within cosmological methodology. On the other hand, by transcending these limits through an enquiry in cosmology's facticity, one inevitably brings cosmology beyond the scope of the natural sciences since, de facto, here humanity enquires into the facticity of its own historically contingent subjectivity. Philosophy here manifests itself as a method of enquiry into the sense-forming activities of human subjectivity in the subject area of the universe as a whole. however, does not exhaust the whole sense of human presence in the universe as the condition for its manifestation. 14 The transcendental sense of cosmological discourse arrives from the recognition that the universe is not that which is manifest, but that it is the manifestation related to humanity. In this sense the universe is always our universe. By its sense the discourse of the universe as the manifestation has to comprise not only the current scope of observations and theories about the universe, but the whole history of formation of views on the cosmos as well as all philosophical and theological issues on the conditions of knowledge of the universe, the telos of this knowledge and its value. The universe as manifestation implies a constant participation or communion with it which is tantamount to saying that the universe as manifestation means life.
The conditions of manifestation of the universe which are always implicitly present behind its empirical appearances and theoretical representations yet escape an explicit constitution.
They reveal themselves through an excess of intuition over logical simplicity and mathematical thoroughness which delivers the paradoxical sense of presence of the universe, the sense which is never disclosed in discursive terms thus leaving one with an immanent awareness of the universe's absence. Put differently, the universe is, but there is no answer to the questions "What is it?" The incompleteness of any physical description of the universe brings us to that stance in knowledge which is called "apophaticism", that is a mode of experience in which that which is intended to be signified through discursive description is never exhausted through its signifiers. The implication of this belief in cosmology is a particular causal structure of the global spacetime of the universe; that is, this belief as an act of intentionality cascades down to physical causality.
Another illustration comes from inflationary cosmology: it confesses a belief that there exists a field Φ (inflaton) 28 , which is described through a corresponding theory and which drives the evolution of the universe during the very early By being engaged in the discourse of the universe as a whole human beings themselves are involved into and subjected to the process of their phenomenalization: on the one hand they take it as their task to control this process through advancing (astronomical) praxis dependent upon their theories; on the other hand the universe remains that overall context and horizon of all horizons which escapes constitution by discursive reason so that it is rather human subjectivity that is constituted by the universe to the extent it cannot comprehend the universe. In this sense cosmology represents not so much that which is manifest, that is the universe as such, but the manifestation, the manifestation which involves the universe and conscious human beings into the endless constitution.
33
Cosmology reveals itself as a contributor to the phenomenological project, as realization of a transcendental discourse.
Phenomenological insight in cosmology as explication of the human
A phenomenological insight into cosmology makes a reversal of its meaning by shifting the centre of its enquiry from the noematic content (that is related to object) to its noetic pole (related to subject), that is the generating human subjectivity. giving meaning, from their pure phenomenality to the intentional life which generated them. By predicating the evolving universe and attempting to phenomenalise the mystery of its contingent origin, human subjectivity employs that intentionality which effectuates the telos of human subjectivity's ever-going incarnation as "coming to presence" assigning thus a dynamic character to personhood's manifestation. 46 As expressed by M. Munitz: "The goals of cosmology are goals of human beings". However, the universe as such benefits from these goals: "Through the measure in which they are reached, the universe becomes understood, perhaps for the first time anywhere throughout its vast stretches in space and time" (Munitz, 1951, p. 338) . A careful analysis of methodological weaknesses in cosmology has been done in a paper of George Ellis (Ellis, 2007) .
2
The word "object" cannot be legitimately applied to the universe because the universe as a singular and self-contained whole cannot be detached from human insight and thus positioned as something which is outside and devoid of the human presence. There is a fundamental inseparability between the universe and the knowing subject who is always a part of the universe. Another problem emerges from the universe's uniqueness which cannot be set among other universes. The modern view of the universe as developed from a singular state (Big Bang) which de facto encodes the universe in its totality invokes a counter-intuitive sense of the universe as a singular, that is unrepeatable event (not an object!) with respect to which the natural sciences experience the sense of fear and desire to explain it away. Edgard Morin expressed the idea that the cosmos reveals itself as the universe and event. On the one hand the physical universe constituted through regular repetitive features, on the other it is a singular event as phenomenon, the phenomenon which evolves for more than ten billion years. The temporal unfolding of the universe which appears to human contemplation lies indissolubly in the advent-event (avènement-événement) of the world (Morin, 1982, p. 120). 3 It is because of the inseparability between the human observer and the universe that the conditions of the universe's observability and mathematical expressibility are constitutive of the very concept of the universe. In this sense the "physical objectivity" of the universe cannot bear an independent reality in a classical sense. Indeed, unlike in classical physics, the basic conditions of the constitution of the universe as a whole have not been permanently available and thus have to be questioned (Cf. Bitbol, et al. 2009, pp. 4, 18.) 4 Terminology of M. Heidegger (Heidegger, 1998, p. 413 ).
5
Here one sees an original sign that cosmology in a way has some features of the human sciences, because it is known that the release from environmental confinement is not necessary for thematisation and objectification in the human sciences, where a perspective on reality is crucially dependent on the researcher's intentionality originating in the existential and socio-historical condition (and thus cannot be environmentally free). Applied to cosmology this would mean that if one implies that the in-itself of the universe (as its identity) be studied, it must preserve this identity as free from any change through the release from environmental confinement, that is from the inherent subjectivity of a knower of the universe.
This was always realised by cosmologists themselves. As an example one can refer to D. Sciama's interview of 1978 where he underlined the existence of a borderline between the ultimate questions about the universe's facticity and the exploration of its properties: "None of us can understand why there is a Universe at all, why anything should exist; that's the ultimate question. But while we cannot answer this question, we can at least make progress with the next simpler one, of what the Universe as a whole is like." (Quoted in (Kragh, 1996, p. xi) .
8
However the very contingent appearance of things in the universe points towards the laws whose outcomes supply these appearances: there must be these laws in order to have these particular things. It is difficult to separate in the universe as a whole between its factual (material) and nomic (law-like) features. In this sense one can talk about facticity of physical laws themselves as linked to the boundary or initial conditions in the universe. See, for example, in this respect (Balashov, 1998, pp. 147; 2009, pp. 269-277). 9 It is this mentioned inseparability which makes the cosmological idea (that is the idea of totality of the world) fundamentally different among other ideas of reason, such as the idea of soul or the idea of God. Kant wrote that neither psychological nor theological idea entail contradiction and contain antinomies. (Kant, 1933 , A673/B701). Practically this means that one can easily deny the existence of a soul (let us say, on materialistic grounds) or deny the existence of God (on atheistic grounds). However it is impossible to deny the existence of the universe for it would deny the empirical world of sense which is part of the universe and which contains the foundation of all knowledge about universe. The antinomian nature of reasoning about the universe originates exactly here: by being in the sensible world one cannot disentangle from the universe, at the same time the universe as totality is never fully materialised in the world of the senses.
10
The fact that the encounter with the problem of the universe as a whole represents more an epistemological issue than anything which can be associated with the natural sciences, was understood long before by such thinkers as Nicholas of Cusa and Kant. The very concept of "learned ignorance", which amounts in modern terms to the apophaticism of knowledge in general, and which had been drawn from astronomical-cosmological considerations, had most of all an epistemological meaning pointing toward the limits of reason and puzzles which it has to encounter while dealing with such a limiting concept as the universe. (See, for example, (Koyré, 1958, pp. 5-19) . A similar sense was attached by Kant to his famous cosmological antinomies, which were indications of the fundamental paradoxical structures of reason rather than any constructive theories of the universe. Here is a characteristic quote from a contemporary treatise on Kant: "Because reason examines itself in order to extract laws from within itself, instead of simply greeting these laws, the cosmological antinomy is the place where the innermost depths of our humanity manifest themselves. In the antinomy, nature speaks to our inquiring minds in the most direct possible way, precisely because, as a complete whole, it is exposed to the danger of being lost in obstinacy or despair." (Kerszberg, 1997, p. 101) .
11
Here, in analogy with Husserl's definition of the "world-horizon" the universe as such is never given in a manner pertaining to ordinary objects. The universe as a horizon of all contexts in the physical and mathematical enquiry in the structure of the world cannot be an object and is distinct from any object given in the background of contexts. The universe is coperceived as the necessary horizon of all individual beings (astronomical or terrestrial) which are immediately experienced. (Husserl,1977, pp. 70-73) ; see also (Steinbock,1995, p. 104.) 12 This distinction can be elucidated by a quote from a paper of C. Harvey: "It is common parlance to say that whereas the natural scientists seek to explain, the human scientists seek to understand. This distinction between understanding and explanation, however is itself predicated upon the deeper distinction between intentionality and causality. If the natural sciences rely upon physicalistic causality as the human sciences rely upon intentionalistic motivation, and the intentionalistic motivation is shown to be prior to causal rationality, then natural science will be shown to be posterior to, because ultimately explainable in terms of, human scientific motifs". (Harvey, 1995, p. 125. Emphasis added) .
13
This paradox is a perennial problem of philosophy and was anticipated by ancient Greek philosophers and Christian thinkers. It was express differently by such philosophers as Kant (see, for example, Kant's conclusion to his Critique of Practical Reason.) Among phenomenological philosophers who dealt with this paradox one can mention E. Husserl, M. Scheler, M. Merleau-Ponty, E. Fromm and others. The general discussion of this paradox can be found in (Carr, 1999) . The decisive role of this paradox in discussion on science and theology can be found in (Nesteruk, 2008, pp. 173-175) . Applied to the study of the universe the paradox of human subjectivity can be formulated as follows: on the one hand human beings in the facticity of their embodied condition form the centre of disclosure and manifestation of the universe as a whole, modelling it as overall-space and time which exceeds the limits of the attuned space related to humanity's comportment on the planet earth (the home place). On the other hand the depicted universe as a vast continuum of space and time positions humanity in an insignificant place in the whole totality making its existence not only contingent (in physical terms) but full of nonsense from the point of view of actually infinite universe. Said bluntly the actual infinity of the universe is attempted to be articulated from an infinitely small part of its formation. One could express this differently: through its insight humanity is co-present in all points of what it observes in the universe, or imagines while physically being restricted to an insignificant part of it. Cosmology as the discourse of the universe as a whole brings one face to face to a general philosophical objective of avoiding any sort of foundationalism in knowledge of the universe which insists on the ground-grounded relation between humanity and the universe leading either to an idealistic reduction (subjectivity as the ground of the world) or to a materialistic, mathematically deterministic diminution of consciousness to illusion. In either mode of reduction the reality of the ground absorbs the grounded and the grounded is reduced to the categories of the ground. To avoid these reductions, the embodiment, as a premise of the person's grasp of the world, must be rather considered as that "over here", where a particular and immediate indwelling of life and the universe comes to presence. It is this coming to presence that determines that "place" which constitutes person as a centre of disclosure and manifestation of the universe.
14 This concerns first of all the dimension of personal (hypostatic) embodiment. Indeed the discursive or linguistic expression of experience of the universe does not rule out the immediate corporeal presence of the universe on the level of sheer consubstantiality between human beings and the universe. Correspondingly if this dimension is overlooked then the per-ceived inability of cosmology to make results personally meaningful can be alienating and frustrating for non-specialists: for example, the sheer insignificance of humanity on the cosmic scale can create a sense of anxiety and despair related to the meaning of human life. However cosmic physics does not exhaust the sense of the human experience of space, or astronomical objects. Our experience of the universe as that mysterious environment with beautiful night skies and warming presence of the life-giving sun exceeds and is much richer than just knowledge of astronomy or solar physics. The problem is that the formalised and mathematised science sometimes has the effect of de-legitimising and de-appreciating other ways of communion with the wonders of space. (Nieman, 2005, pp. 383-388) .
15
One can mention that the "apophatic" conviction applied to some limiting situations in cognition is well known in history of philosophical and theological thought. Generalising this conviction towards knowledge in general, C. Yannaras describes "as "apophatic" that linguistic semantics and attitude to cognition which refuses to exhaust the content of knowledge in its formulation, which refuses to exhaust the reality of things signified in the logic of signifiers (Yannaras, 2004, p. 84) . In philosophy, for example, it originates from an epistemological argument pertaining to a sort of linguistic reformulation of the Kantian transcendentalism (which is typical for post-structuralism) that language conditions the accessibility and intelligibility of reality. In this approach the very phrase "there is" points to a referent which the very language cannot capture because the referent is not constituted by language and by definition is not the same as it linguistic effect. According to this view there is no access to the referent outside the linguistic effect, but the linguistic effect is not the same as that referent it attempts but fails to capture. This situation entails, in analogy with theology, a variety of ways of making such a reference, where none of which can claim it exclusiveness and true accessibility to what the reference is made. A phenomenological philosopher J. Ladrière, without using the notion of apophaticism, points towards the same feature of any knowledge, more precisely to the apophaticism of that fashion in which the human existent approaches the encounter with the world. An object is never a pure reference to itself, but is also a revelation of the fashion of its comprehension. (Ladrière, 1970, pp. 448, 450) . The range of cognitive situations which fall under the scope of apophaticism can be found in works of J.-L. Marion under the name of "saturated phenomenon". See (Marion, 2002) .
16
C.f. "A philosophy of nature and a philosophy of man are mutually complementary;… neither can be completed unless it shows itself as the counterpart of the other", (De Laguna, 1966, pp. 81-82) .
17
This, for example, can be related to the cosmological principle which postulates uniformity of the universe beyond observational limits. Another example is a famous "inflaton" field which drives the exponential expansion of the early universe.
18
Multiverse proposals in cosmology refer effectively to the old idea of the plurality of worlds understood either in a physical sense as an ensemble of worlds with all possible physical conditions, or a variety of mathematical structures which have or do not have their incarnation in the physical. In this case the existence of our universe in its contingent facticity is explained away through a reference that it simply belongs (in a generic sense) to an ensemble of universes which through its totality contains whatever is possible. (The literature on the multiverse is vast, as an example see a paper (Tegmark, 2003) or a book with a variety of papers on different aspects of the multiverse debate.) In all multiverse proposals the question of existence, that is of the contingent facticity of this universe, is thus quite illegitimately transferred to the question of selection, whereas the issue of the existence of the multiverse itself cannot not addressed at all for obvious philosophical reasons.
19
There is a tiny piece of the human observer's world line which relates to the immediate cosmic environment like the earth, planets in the solar system, stars in our galaxy which, in terms of cosmic times and thus space, are "close" to us so that their separation from us is in a way "commensurable" with the humankind's life span. We assert the existence of such objects in terms similar to those of the earthly objects.
20
Thesis B1 in (Ellis, 2007 (Ellis, , p. 1220 .
21
See, for example, (McMullin, 1994, pp. 119-120). 22 This is the terminology of E. Husserl (Husserl, 1981) .
23
On eidetic variation in phenomenology see e.g. (Sokolowski, 2000, pp. 177-84) .
24
This is a longstanding point made in (Meyerson, 1964) . 25 See, for example, (Dancy,1989, p. 116). 26 There are discussions at present that the universe may not be uniform at large and that the observed uniformity is the result that we are centred in a sort of void.
27
Discussing the cosmological principle in close connection with the so called Copernican principle, E. McMullin points out that the Copernican principle has to be understood in terms of what it rejects, namely older teleological beliefs about the uniqueness of the human and the likelihood that humanity has a selected position in space, for example being a cosmic center. ( McMullin, 1993, p. 373) . However the desire to abandon the teleological explanation is itself based in intentionality, rather than any scientifically demonstrable conviction. The indifference postulated by the cosmological principle is indemonstrable because it itself lies in the foundation of the very possibility of scientific demonstration applied to cosmology. Thus it is based in the belief in knowability of the universe which has a different motivation in comparison with that one of teleology (but related to the latter).
28
In spite of the fact that the hypothesis of this field, its very existence, is very efficient in a qualitative and quantitative modelling of observable phenomena, the physical nature of this field, that is its relation to a certain class of observed particles, remains obscure. This is one of the major points of scepticism with respect to inflationary theories, which has been raised, for example, in the abovementioned paper of Ellis (Ellis, 2007 (Ellis, , p. 1210 . (See a similar point made in (Penrose, 2005, p. 751) and in (Weinberg, 2008, pp. 202, 217) ).
29
These are famous horizon, monopole and flatness problems. See e.g. (Weinberg, 2008, pp. 201-208) . See also (Penrose, 2005, pp. 753-57) , in what concerns a certain critique of the inflationary hypothesis.
30
C. f. (Torrance, 1996, pp. 166-7) .
See, for example, discussion of this issue in (Leslie, 1989) , (Temple, 1994) , (Stoeger, 2007) , (Collins, 2007) .
32
This thought was anticipated by Henry Margenau who believed that modern physics could provide an evidence that the nature of its reality is determined not only through causation in empirical reality, but also through intentional acts of thought. In his approach to the nature of physical reality he posed a question: "Is sensed nature the only field of departure or arrival in the process of scientific verification, or will inspection of the eidetic structures of consciousness function in a similar way as dator of scientific fact?" (Margenau, 1944, p. 278 ).
33
C.f. (Ladrière, 1972, pp. 169, 173, 176) .
34
In the context of the so called anthropic inference this was pointed out by (Bitbol, 1993) . In a wider philosophical and theological context this excess of humanity beyond nature was discussed in (Nesteruk, 2001 ).
35
The cosmic environment provides the necessary conditions for human corporeal existence (and this is exactly detected in anthropic arguments) whereas the sufficient conditions do not belong to the sphere of physics and point towards human morality, ethics and some eschatological commitments. See discussion in (Nesteruk, 2003, pp. 200-214) .
36
One can point to similarities between the phenomenology of birth and the aspirations of cosmologists to disclose the sense of birth (origin) of the universe. See (Nesteruk, 2008, pp. 247-66) . "Is there not, when we read it sufficiently profoundly, an analogy between the deep structure of nature and the structure of human existence as openness, creativity, possibility of accord with the event? The problematic of nature can thus be linked with the problematic of human existence." (J. Ladrière, 1972, p. 186) .
37
The idea that a research into the underlying sense of science leads to enlightenment of the ways and telos of the human spirit was clearly formulated by many phenomenological philosophers starting from Husserl. Here is a quote from J. Ladrière: "The detail of the life of science must […] be investigated in order to know something of the nature of reason and of its becoming…The destiny of reason is outlined […] in the incessant comings and goings that define the life of science. It is in the patient advance of its history that its finality reveals itself" (Ladrière, 1970, p. 455) .
38
The phenomenological construct of "presence in absence" can be easily applied to cosmology. For example: we see the universe back in time along the so called past light cone, so that the inference about the universe outside this cone can be considered as an attempt to deal with the universe as a whole which is present in its empirical absence. A similar thing can be said if one remembers that according to present-day model the visible matter represents only 4% of the whole material content of the universe. The other 96% (dark energy and dark matter) is postulated in order to balance the model with observations. In other words the universe is present to us through 4% of what is visibly manifested but in empirical absence of the 96%.
39
A basic and unavoidable structure of any cosmological myth, including its contemporary scientific arrangement is the duality between the factual and empirical on the one hand, and the intelligible (as allegedly stable and underlying) on the other hand. See e.g. (Ladrière, 1972, p. 153 ).
40
As it was eloquently expressed by A. Gurwitsch, "the goal of phenomenology is not an exhaustive description of an infinite variety of immanent data, but the investigation of those contexts of consciousness owing to which there is a perceptible world, the universe of physical constructs, etc." (Gurwitsch, 1992, pp. 43-44) .
41
It is the presence of this concrete path of science which confirms our previous stance on cosmology as the working of constitution, that is a re-enactment of the production of the world. To clarify this point one can quote another paper of J. Ladrière: "The theoretical apparatus is thus not a description in the ordinary sense, as presentation of an entity, supposedly given, and of its properties, it is the characterisation of something which is not a thing, but a structural path along which a thing comes, from the ultimate horizon of every givenness, to the actual presence in which it is effectively given to apprehension." (Ladrière, 1989, p. 138) . (Emphasis added.) 42 C.f. (Aron, 1938, p. 80). 43 See (Nesteruk, 2008, pp. 250-254; 2009, pp. 78-81) .
44
Physical cosmology makes it clear that the world line of the human observer starts at the Big Bang, so that whatever we have on our physical content is directly related to that undifferentiated something lying in the foundation of all possible form of mater in the universe.
45
See, e.g., (Swimme, 2005, p. 7) , (Mathews, 1991, p. 5) , (Kline, 1977, p. 423 ).
46
C.f., (Heelan, 1972) . See also in this context (Compton, 1967, p. 82) .
47
As was provocatively conjectured by an author from the camp of the human sciences and arts, we need "a sort of "mythoscientific, neo-anthropomorphic" theory, one that would stay operational by combining the findings of mainstream science with conjectures based on mythological thought. This type of theory would map features of the universe through images taken from the domain of human social behaviour….Although anthropomorphic theories might not be operational, they can lead to a better understanding of the universe." (Friedman,1993, p. 361 ).
